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Justice or Equality?*
JOHN-STEWART GORDON**
The paper has two aims. First, I discuss the most important arguments in the ‘Why-Equality’ debate 
with respect to the egalitarian and prioritarian point of views on the relation between justice and 
equality. This entails: the by-product objection of equality, the objection of inhumanity, the objection of 
complexity and the argument of the presumption of equality. Second, I give on the basis of the analysis 
of the main arguments a short outline of an own account on the relation between justice and equality. 
It follows that justice and equality are closely connected and that a sound egalitarianism has to pay 
more attention to the objections of the prioritarians, although a sophisticated version of pluralistic 
egalitarianism seems to be superior to prioritarianism. 
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Introduction 
The two most important classical analyses in the history of philosophy on the nature 
of justice are due to Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics, V.) and Mill (Utilitarianism, V.). 
Both philosophers, and this should be no surprise, clearly state, that ‘justice’ and 
‘equality’ are closely connected. In the last decades, the prioritarians, instead, dispute 
the close relation between justice and equality in their criticism on the egalitarian view 
in the ‘Why-Equality?’ debate. The very question is, if equality is the most or one of 
the most important part(s) of justice or if it has no or nearly no importance for the 
nature of justice at all. The aim of this paper is to review the main arguments on both 
sides to end the trench combats and, maybe, to mediate between the two groups, suc-
cessfully. So, in the first part, I will make some short remarks on the ‘Why-Equality’ 
debate and give a description of the egalitarian and prioritarian view. In the second 
part I will discuss the most important arguments in the debate and I will present, in 
the third part, a short outline of an own account on the relation between justice and 
equality on the basis of the analysis made in the second part. The last part ends with 
some closing remarks 
________________________ 
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1.
Some interesting and illuminating articles had been published concerning the ‘Why-
Equality?’ debate in the last years. But, the main question, if egalitarianism or priori-
tarianism has the most plausible conception of the relation between ‘justice’ and 
‘equality,’ has not been successfully answered, yet. Unfortunately, there had been at-
tacks from both sides, which show that they did not attack the strongest but a (very) 
weak version of the opponents’ view. Gosepath, a German ‘constitutive egalitarian,’ is 
totally right in saying, that: 
“Die dem Egalitarismus oft unterstellten Kriterien strikter Ergebnisgleichheit 
bei der Verteilung materieller Güter oder strikter Gleichheit des Wohlergehens 
werden kaum von einem Egalitaristen vertreten. Zu offensichtlich sind deren 
moralische Unzulänglichkeiten” (Gosepath 2003: 276). 
Of course, it should be clear, methodologically, that one has to face the strongest 
view, not a travesty. A second mistake within the ‘Why-Equality?’ debate, in my view, 
is the fact that the notions justice and equality are also discussed – to a great extent – 
under the heading of questions of distributions, although this had been the main point 
of the ‘Equality-of-What’ debate, e.g. ‘equality of resources’ (Rawls 1971, 1993; 
Dworkin 1981; Rakowski 1991; van Parijs 1995), ‘equality of opportunity for welfare’ 
(Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1996, 1998), or ‘equality of capability to func-
tion’ (Sen 1992). And this is, of course, a very misleading focus, especially, if one 
wants to determine the relation between these two important notions with regard to 
the question of justification. Questions of distributions are just one part of the story. 
So, let us see how far the range really is. Thirdly, the two most extreme assumptions 
(i.) justice is equality and (ii.) justice has nothing to do with equality are far from being 
plain, since common sense can easily show, that these assumptions are just superflu-
ous ones, so, they are out of sight right from the beginning. But, the interesting ones 
are situated right in-between and the following analysis has to show which sound rela-
tion between justice and equality exists. Equality should not be discussed in socio-
economic circumstances, only, but also in the moral and political realm, therefore, 
egalitarians and prioritarians are not right in diminishing the discussion on the socio-
economic realm. Maybe, it was the influences of Rawls’ famous book ‘A theory of 
Justice’ (1971), which determine the discussion in this direction in the last three dec-
ades.
But, what are egalitarianism and prioritarianism? Egalitarians, on the one hand, think, 
firstly, that unfair life prospects should be equalized. Secondly, that equality is the 
most or one of the most important irreducible intrinsic or constitutive worth(s) of justice. 
Thirdly, that welfare should be increased. Fourthly, that justice is comparative. Fifthly, 
that inequalities are just when otherwise advantages are destroyed in the name of jus-
tice (against Parfits’ so-called ‘levelling down objection,’ Parfit 1998: 10). Lastly, that 
there are certain absolute humanitarian principles like autonomy, freedom or human 
dignity. Prioritarians, on the other hand, think, firstly, that equality itself cannot be a 
foundation of justice and that it is no important irreducible aim of justice, it has no 
intrinsic moral worth (Frankfurt 1997) and it has no or at least no fundamental impor-
tance with regard to the justification of justice, it is rather a by-product although it has 
some importance as reducible worth (Raz 1986). Secondly, the fulfilment of absolute 
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standards like human dignity, respect, or citizenship are of utmost importance to give 
people the opportunity to live a human being-worthy life and not a life in miserable 
circumstances (Walzer 1983; Raz 1986; Frankfurt 1997; Parfit 1998; Anderson 1999). 
Thirdly, people should have access to food and shelter, medical basic supply, or 
should have private and political autonomy etc. Fourthly, equality has some impor-
tance i.) in being a by-product, ii.) or in being one part among other parts as a com-
parative factor, e.g., in equality before the law, concerning equal chances, or with re-
gard to the prohibition of discrimination, iii.) or in being a precondition for the fulfil-
ment of certain absolute standards like political autonomy, social affiliation, and liberty 
of exchange (Krebs 2000, 2003). 
Of course, the description I have given is just a short overview and, certainly, not as 
sophisticated as the lengthy egalitarian and prioritarian accounts, but for our purpose 
the description is good enough to see the main points at once and to have a first im-
pression.
2.
In this part, I will discuss the main objections against the egalitarians made by the 
prioritarians on the one hand and analyse one of the main arguments of the egalitari-
ans on the other hand. The main objections are, firstly, the by-product objection of 
equality (Raz 1986; Frankfurt 1987, 1997; Parfit 1998), secondly, the objection of in-
humanity (Anderson 1999) and, thirdly, the objection of complexity (Walzer 1983). 
One of the main arguments with regard to the egalitarian view is the presumption of 
equality argument (Berlin 1955/56; Tugendhat 1997; Gosepath 2001). 
Firstly, the egalitarian view that equality is the central aim or one of the most impor-
tant aims of justice and should not be seen as a mere by-product had been a mayor 
point of criticism on the prioritarian side (Raz 1986: 218-221, 227-229; Frankfurt 
1987: 32-34 and 1997: 7 and 11; Parfit 1998: 13-15). They think that equality is a mere 
by-product and it is due to absolute standards like human dignity or respect etc., 
whereas egalitarian equality is due to relational standards. It is always good to give 
counterexamples, which show that there is something wrong with the other view and, 
certainly, the prioritarians are not getting weary to present them, but, the question is, if 
some of their main examples are not self-defeating in a way and show just the oppo-
site or at least something else. 
The first example, I would like to discuss, is also presented by many prioritarians who 
state, that in cases of people’s hunger and illness or deficiency of goods they should be 
helped because hunger, illness, and deficiency of goods are terrible circumstances for 
every human being and not because other people are in a better condition. The hunger 
and illness of other people or the deficiency of goods directly put us in the situation to 
help these people without making any comparison between them and those people 
who are better off. Frankfurt, not unconvincingly, says that substantial – and not for-
mal – definitions certainly have genuine moral importance and that it depends on 
human beings who live a good life and not on how their life is with regard to other 
human beings’ lives (Frankfurt 1997: 6). But, what is to be said on these cases? 
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It seems to be that prioritarians really think that egalitarians worship equality for the 
sake of equality only. But, of course, this is not the case and the whole idea of that 
conception would be, right from the beginning, far away from being a sound justifica-
tion. In cases of illness, hunger and deficiency of goods the role of equality is not that 
simple as prioritarians want to make other people believe. Their objection loses its 
power, totally, if one acknowledges that people in cases of illness, hunger or deficiency 
of goods should be treated equally as human beings if they get supply, that means 
there is no primarily discrimination ongoing. Equality has many faces and impartiality 
is one of it. Of course, there is room for proportional equality in cases of, for instance, 
deficiency of goods. This would be, certainly, no contradiction within the egalitarian 
view – proportional equality is part of equality. The idea that equality always means 
arithmetical equality is a travesty coming from the prioritarians.  
The second example is Parfit’s ‘levelling down objection’ (Parfit 1998: chapter 4). 
Given, that inequalities as such are bad their disappearance would be, in one respect, a 
change to something, which is better. If, so Parfit, the better off people lose all their 
additional resources by a natural disaster and are in the same terrible situation than the 
other people, it would be, in one respect, something, which is to be welcome on the 
teleological egalitarianism view, although some people lost all of their additional re-
sources and nobody else could profit, instead. Or, in the famous example given by 
Parfit:
“Similarly, it would be in one way an improvement if we destroyed the eyes of 
the sighted, not to benefit the blind, but only to make the sighted blind. These 
implications can be more plausibly regarded as monstrous, or absurd” (Parfit 
1998: chapter 4). 
But, of course, Parfit knows that this would be not enough to criticize the egalitarians 
by using this objection, ‘it is not enough to claim that it would be wrong to produce 
equality by levelling down.’ Therefore he states: 
“Our objection must be that, if we achieve equality by levelling down, there is 
nothing good about what we have done. Similarly, if some natural disaster makes 
everyone equally badly off, that is not in any way good news” (Parfit 1998: chap-
ter 4). 
It seems to be that Parfit thinks of an opponent who does everything for his worship-
ping of equality – that means equality for the sake of equality. There is hardly any egali-
tarian who would agree on that. Therefore, plain egalitarians think that inequalities are 
justified, if the only means to remove inequality would be to ‘level down’ the better 
off people to the standard of the badly off people, without any improvement with 
regard to the badly off people. The destruction of advantages in the name of justice is 
also unacceptable on the egalitarian view. There is a lot of rhetoric in this kind of ob-
jection. But, one should keep in mind that Parfit makes a distinction between the 
teleological and the deontic egalitarianism in this passage. And, it is only the teleologi-
cal egalitarianism, in Parfit’s view, that is open for criticism. The deontic egalitarian, 
unlike the teleological egalitarian, has no problem with the view that inequality itself is 
not bad in a way. But, so Parfit, ‘we may find it harder to justify some of our beliefs’ 
when adopting the deontic view. Although distinctions may be fruitful they could also 
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obscure our mind and this would be my objection to Parfit’s view because he attacks 
views no one would fighting for since nobody hold such kind of extreme views. I have 
pretty much sympathy with the teleological and deontic view but I guess no sound 
philosopher would argue for the extreme version of teleological egalitarianism, like 
nobody would argue for a true consequentialism. The truth is, as often, right in the 
middle. A sound egalitarianism should incorporate teleological and deontic aspects. 
Hence, the ‘levelling down objection’ lost its power. 
The plain egalitarian – and not the simple-minded travesty of it – is not forced to 
believe that, although equality might be the or a central aim of justice, one should wor-
ship equality for the sake of equality, without keeping in mind, that cases of hunger, 
illness, deficiency of goods, or the ‘levelling down objection’ exist and need special 
treatment in the conception of egalitarianism. Of course, it should be clear now, that 
the by-product objection is a weak one since it addresses a travesty and not a strong 
version of pluralistic egalitarianism. 
Secondly, the objection of inhumanity, which had been brought into the discussion by 
Anderson 1999, again, is one of the main arguments against egalitarianism. Anderson’s 
version of the argument has three different parts, firstly, the ‘fault is-up-to-them’ ob-
jection (Anderson 1999: 295-302; also Barry 1991: 149 and MacLeod 1998: 75p.), 
secondly, the objection of stigmatizing (Anderson 1999: 302-307; also MacLeod 1998: 
106-108), and thirdly, the tutelage objection (Anderson 1999: 310; also Hayek 1960: 
85-102). The first part is an objection against the (supposed) egalitarian view that peo-
ple who are responsible for their own terrible situation should be left alone with their 
problems, no matter what happens to them. The second part is an objection against 
the kind of reasons egalitarians have in order to help people who are in a terrible situa-
tion, which did not arise through their own fault. The third part is an objection against 
the decision-making of the state – in which category a misery should be placed – and 
the investigation of the citizens in order to get the relevant information for the state. 
This would be, in Anderson’s view, a case of putting the citizens under the tutelage of 
the state and harming their private sphere. If the objection of inhumanity is or is not a 
serious threat to a sophisticated version of a pluralistic egalitarianism, should be ana-
lysed in the following part.1
It is always strange to criticise a hardliner view and not a sophisticated version of it. 
Maybe, this should have been part of Anderson’s considerations with regard to the 
‘fault is-up-to-them’ objection (‘bad option luck’), but it seems that she forgot what 
she learned in her first term. Luck egalitarianism wants to equalize undeserved life-
prospects, the people should be responsible for their decisions, that means, strictly 
speaking, they have no justified demands for supply, if they get into a miserable situa-
tion on their own fault. Of course, Anderson is right in her criticism of Rakowski’s 
view (1991), who states that it would be all right to let a guilty car driver die in a hospi-
tal, who has no assurance and illegally made a turn over on the street which causes a 
serious accident. The guilty car driver, so Rakowski, has no legal demands to be kept 
on the artificial respiration apparatus, any longer. This is, of course, absurd and inhu-
man. Rakowski’s whole egalitarian theory (equality of resources) is far from being 
________________________ 
1  See also Arneson’s illuminating discussion of Anderson’s objections (Arneson 2000). 
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sound and Anderson is right to criticise him for that, but, instead of her lengthy criti-
cism of a travesty, she should have discussed the more sophisticated accounts of e.g. 
van Parijs who argues for a minimum wage (1991, 1995), Arneson who argues for 
equal chances of opportunity for welfare (1989), or Cohen and Roemer – the two 
marxist theorists – who argue for equal access to advantages as a condition of equality 
(Cohen 1989) and for the equal participation of all households on the capital yields 
(Roemer 1992), in more detail. 
However, there is no question about it, there is hardly any reasonable human being 
who would like to live in Rakowski’s world. Society should help people no matter if 
they caused their own disaster or not, they are human beings and this is the best rea-
son to give them a helping hand if they lost the right track.2 Of course, people who 
lived a jet-set life should not have a (legal) demand to live such a life again, if they 
caused a disaster and lost everything and the only way to be better off again would be 
to let society pay for it. This would be ridiculous but they should live a human being-
worthy life and society has to pay for it, no matter what the price is. And this account 
does not contradict with a sophisticated version of a pluralistic egalitarianism. On this 
point, Anderson cites Arneson who thinks that it might be unfair to make people 
responsible for their actions in all circumstances since responsible decisions are de-
pendent on necessary capacities – foresight, steadfastness, ability to calculate, strong 
will, self-confidence – which are partly due to one’s genes or the luck to have good 
parents. Therefore, those people have a demand on a special paternalistic protection 
by society with regard to their own bad decisions. Arneson thinks that this could be 
financed by an obligatory social contribution of the people to a pension scheme. Oth-
ers, so Anderson, hold the view that a strict compensation of welfare should also be 
modified by paternalistic intervention. That means only paternalistic reasons could 
make social contributions obligatory and could justify the distribution of a monthly 
guaranteed income. 
Anderson rightly disputes the fact that luck egalitarians show the necessary respect for 
citizens since they state that people, who had hard luck by virtue of their own fault, 
‘earn’ it. But, she is on the wrong path when she criticises other egalitarians who want 
to help the badly off people by social assurances on paternalistic reasons. These pater-
nalistic reasons – in order to justify obligatory social assurances – are, in her opinion, a 
sign of taking citizens to be silly and to be unable to organise their own lives. It is hard 
to see, so Anderson, how one can expect from citizens not to lose their self-esteem by 
accepting this kind of justification. 
Amy Gutmann rightly criticises Anderson on two points, firstly, she states that even 
egalitarians should be able to argue that there are special cases – like the guilty car 
driver case – which are so badly that these people should be helped, even if they got 
________________________ 
2  I hold this to be a milestone of the development in human history since people who dispute this 
assumption do not know what it means to be part of a “real” community. To ask oneself the 
question, seriously, why should society help those people, is to be as cold as ice towards helpless 
people. What about the idea of humanity and charity, the idea to show compassion with mem-
bers of one’s own community, or with the conception of beneficence? To be cold-heartedly on 
this matter is a bad condition for a community which is oriented to the idea of human flourishing 
– the basic concept of each (sound) community.  
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into the miserable situation on their own fault. Secondly, paternalism could be an 
honourable and compelling principle of legislation. Hence, it must not be humiliating 
for the state to make laws, for instance, on wearing safety belts, insofar the laws are 
due to a democratic process. Although Anderson shares the intention of these argu-
ments, she states on the first point that the very idea to guarantee special kind of 
goods would contradict with the spirit of luck egalitarianism. Of course, it might be 
that this line of argument, Gutmann brought into the discussion, speaks against luck 
egalitarianism but not against a sophisticated version of a pluralistic egalitarianism. So, 
Anderson’s objection to the first point is weak, without presenting any further argu-
ment. The safety belt case, so Anderson, is not a good example for restricting the 
citizen’s liberty with regard to cases in which their liberty is restricted to a great 
amount, like in cases of coercive partaking of social assurances. The society’s justifica-
tion should be much stronger than the claim that society knows the citizen’s interests 
better than they do. And again, Anderson missed Gutmann’s point; there should be 
no problem for citizens to take part in a social assurance when it is reasonable for 
them. Under the ‘veil of ignorance,’ to take up Rawl’s famous thought-experiment, 
everybody would agree on a social assurance if the advantages, for instance not to die 
in a hospital by virtue of having no assurance at all, rule out the disadvantage of coer-
cive partaking. We – and, of course, also plain egalitarians – do not want to live in a 
society where people have to die, because they have not got a social assurance, for 
whatever reasons. And, if the price for it is to take part in a social assurance, even if it 
is a liability, you should not hesitate to do so. But, if you decided not to take part and 
you are the guilty car driver, you should be helped, no matter what the costs are.3 This 
is due to human dignity and I see no sound counterargument why pluralistic egalitari-
ans should not be able to integrate this idea in their conception without losing their 
track.
The objection of stigmatizing is an objection against the kind of reasons egalitarians 
have in order to help people who are in terrible situations, which did not arise through 
their own fault (‘bad brute luck’), for instance, disabled people from birth, or people 
who became disabled by virtue of an illness or an accident, or people with (very) poor 
natural talents etc. Anderson thinks, firstly, that there is no care for all badly off peo-
ple, if one looks at the rules, which lay down who belongs to the ‘bad brute luck’ peo-
ple, and secondly, the reasons to help the ‘bad brute luck’ people are discriminating 
for them. 
So, what is Anderson’s argument for her hypotheses? The reasons offered to distrib-
ute extra resources to handicapped people, so Anderson on the egalitarian view, are 
wrong because ‘[p]eople lay claim to the resources of egalitarian redistribution in vir-
________________________ 
3  Of course, there is a practical necessity for every society not to pay for everyone; the social assur-
ances of the state could only finance a limited number of people who do not have – for whatever 
reasons – a social assurance. Every reasonable human being is aware of this situation without 
considering any further argument. Hence, it should be in everybody’s interest, in order to relieve 
society of high extra costs, to pay for one’s own social assurance. Therefore, it is in society’s in-
terest – and this means in the end in the interest of everybody – to force the people by law to 
have their own social assurances. In this case, nothing speaks against being forced to one’s own 
luck. 
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tue of their inferiority to others, not in virtue of their equality to others’ (Anderson 
1999: 306). The principles of distribution are based on pity, which is in her view in-
compatible with the respect for human dignity. Hence, the main question is in her 
opinion, if a theory of justice, which is based on contemptuous pity for the alleged 
beneficiaries, could serve egalitarian standards that equal respect of each human being 
is the basis of justice. She comes to the conclusion that luck egalitarianism disregards 
the basic requirements, which every sound egalitarian theory should have. Before I 
will dispute Anderson’s main argument, I would like to say something more on her 
distinction between pity and compassion. One might argue that the concern of the 
‘equality of fortune’-theorists is based on humanitarian compassion and not on con-
temptuous pity, but even than, so Anderson, one has to keep the distinctions between 
the two notions in mind: 
“Compassion is based on an awareness of suffering, an intrinsic condition of a 
person. Pity, by contrast, is aroused by a comparison of the observer’s condition 
with the condition of the object of pity” (Anderson 1999: 306p.). 
 In Anderson’s view, ‘compassion’ says that the person in question is badly off and 
‘pity’ says that the person in question is worse off than oneself (‘she is sadly inferior to 
me’). Both can move one to help others, who are in need, ‘but only pity is conde-
scending.’ But, even for the sake of argument, to take ‘humanitarian compassion’ as a 
starting point, this would be no sound basis for egalitarian principles of distribution, 
because compassion aims at relieving suffering and not equalizing it. She states, ac-
cording to Raz (1986: 242), that once people are relieved of their suffering and needi-
ness, compassion could not generate a further need of an equality of condition. The 
equality of fortune does not express compassion, it is not about the absolute misery of 
the person in question, it is about the gap between the best off and the worse off peo-
ple. Thus, the better off people – who are guided by the considerations of luck egali-
tarianism – have a certain kind of feeling of superiority towards people, who are in 
need and, vice versa, the badly off people are envious and seek for an equal distribu-
tion of resources. Their criterion is an envy-free distribution (Anderson 1999: 306p.). 
Of course, there is something wrong with her argument. It might has some plausibility 
on the first sight, but a second glance shows that she mixed up two aspects, which 
should be sharply divided, the ‘factum’ of equality and the feeling of inferiority. In 
detail, her claim that pity is incompatible with human dignity is far from being plain 
and the only reason why this claim seems to be justified is that her notion of ‘pity’ is 
of a certain kind. Anderson’s definition of pity rests on her dubious assumption that 
‘pity’ is something that is due to a comparison between the conditions of the people 
involved and the feeling of those people, who help others who are in need, but, there 
is no necessity that those, who help others who are in need, have a certain kind of 
feeling, like, ‘she is really inferior to me’ (Anderson 1999). Of course, it might be that 
some people feel like that, but most people would refuse this kind of talk. They would 
say that one has to help others who are in need because they are human beings, equal to 
me, and they did not deserve it to be left alone with their handicap. If one were one of 
them – one might argue – one would not like to be left alone, either. It is right that 
Anderson’s special definition is incompatible with human dignity, but there are other 
definitions, for instance, Schopenhauer’s account of pity, which would be compatible 
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with human dignity.4 But even, so Anderson, if one agrees on humanitarian compas-
sion as starting point for an egalitarian distribution, it would not be enough, since 
‘compassion’ aims to ‘relieve suffering’ and not to ‘equalize’ it. According to the com-
passion view there is no ‘moral judgment on those who suffer’ (Anderson 1999: 307) 
and there is no further distribution in sight if the suffering of the people has been 
relieved. But, this is no objection against the compassion view at all. Firstly, as I al-
ready stated, there is no necessity to have a certain kind of feeling, like, ‘she is really 
inferior to me,’ and secondly, if disabled people are cured, there is, of course, no fur-
ther reason to give them extra resources. They are in a good healthy condition again. 
Anderson’s main point is that luck egalitarianism claim that disabled people get extra 
resources by virtue of their inferiority and not by virtue of their equality to other peo-
ple. One has to differentiate between i.) the improper special feeling of certain kind of 
people, who help others who are in need (‘she is really inferior to me’), and their mo-
tivation to help the needy people and ii.) the ‘true’ reason why, for instance, disabled 
people should be treated equally and differently at the same time. Differently, because 
they get extra resources according to proportional equality, and equally, because they 
are human beings and should be treated morally equal, according to arithmetical 
equality. All versions of egalitarianism have one main aspect in common and I think 
that Anderson ‘ignores’ this important aspect in her talk about what the reasons are to 
help people who are in need. The notion of ‘human dignity’ is due to – at least – four 
different sources: the Stoa (e.g. Cicero), the biblical talk of ‘imago dei,’ Kant (GMS) 
and early Socialism. Human dignity is not a privilege few people have but something, 
which belongs to human beings by nature, although one should add that it could not 
be proved but acknowledged. The very first mention of the word ‘human’ is the Latin 
notion ‘humanus’ in an anonymous work called ‘Rhetorica ad Herennium’ (ca. 84/83 
ante Chr.), later on, this word could also be found in Cicero’s works. The Latin word 
‘humanitas,’ which is the ‘abstractum’ of the word ‘humanus,’ describes ‘humanity’ not 
in a neutral way but gives a definition, it states: the sum of intellectual norms and prac-
tical behaviour makes out of human beings ‘true’ human beings. According to this 
idea of human dignity, Samuel v. Pufendorf shows in his system of natural law (‘De 
iure naturae et gentium libri octo,’ 1672) that the idea of the equality of human beings 
is due to the conception of human dignity. This thought – mediated by John Wise – 
had also a strong influence on the conception of the American Declaration of Human 
Rights (1776) regarding the idea of equality.5 This whole background from the ancient 
roots to modern times seems to be out of sight to Anderson’s view. There is no ques-
tion about it, if egalitarians speak of equality in a fundamental way, they mean that, for 
instance, disabled people should get extra resources, not because they are inferior but 
because they have the same right to be treated with respect and fairness like other 
people, too. They should be helped because they are human beings, like other human 
beings, and they are, simply speaking, in need of help. 
________________________ 
4  This example should not be understood as a proof that Schopenhauer’s account (Über die 
Grundlage der Moral) is more plausible than Anderson’s view but it shows that there are differ-
ent interesting accounts, which could not reasonably claim to be the only valid description of the 
notion ‘pity’. 
5  See Honecker 1990: 192-196. 
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The tutelage objection is against the decision-making of the state – in which category a 
misery should be placed – and the investigation of the citizens in order to get the rele-
vant information for the state’s decision. This would be, in Anderson’s view, a case of 
putting the citizens under the tutelage of the state and harming their private sphere 
(Anderson 1999: 310; also Hayek 1960: 85-102). ‘Equality of fortune,’ so Anderson, 
says ‘that no one should suffer from undeserved misfortune’ (Anderson 1999: 310). 
But, in order to determine which people are allowed to get special treatment (res. extra 
resources) the state must make judgments on the people’s moral responsibility con-
cerning their situation to brute or option luck (see her example of the smoker6). In 
citing Hayek (1960: 95-97) who states that 
“(…) in order to lay a claim to some important benefit, people are forced to 
obey other people’s judgments of what uses they should have made of their op-
portunities, rather than following their own judgments” (Anderson 1999: 310). 
Anderson concludes that such a system would require the state to make ‘grossly intru-
sive, moralizing judgments of individual’s choices’ (Anderson 1999: 310). Hence, 
equality of fortune contradicts with citizen’s privacy and liberty. This would be in 
Korsgaard’s view (1993: 61), on which Anderson is affirmatively referring to, a disre-
spectful behaviour of the state: 
“But it is disrespectful for the state to pass judgment on how much people are 
responsible for their expensive tastes or their imprudent choices” (Anderson 
1999: 310). 
Of course, there is some plausibility in her objection against the function of the state 
to decide which people are morally responsible for their situation according to brute 
or option luck. But, let us assume – for the sake of argument – that everybody would 
agree on the point to help people, who suffer from undeserved misfortune. The very 
question is, then, how the state could organise a system, which treats everyone fairly 
and with respect. It is a practical necessity that the state decides which people get extra 
resources financed by the social community. And, it should be no problem, at all, to 
say that if the state is spending public money, someone has to prove the legitimacy of 
requests. Therefore, the state needs information and this has nothing to do with harm-
ing the people’s liberty or private sphere. It is a hard thing to decide how far this gath-
ering of information by the state should go, of course, no one would like to live in a 
state where Big Brother is watching you all the time, but one must acknowledge the 
simple fact that the state has to take precautions not to be deceived by social cheaters. 
If you want public money, you better should have a sound reason, if not, you might be 
a cheater. It is not about ‘expensive tastes’ or ‘imprudent choices’ (Korsgaard 1993), 
rather it is about the question if one suffers from undeserved misfortune or not. 
Anderson is right in stating that there are cases, which could be very complex (see her 
________________________ 
6  “To determine whether a smoker who picked up the habit while a soldier shall get state-funded 
medical treatment for lung cancer, other people must judge whether he should have shown 
stronger resolve against smoking, given the social pressures he faced from peers and advertisers 
while serving in the army, the anxiety-reducing benefits of smoking in the highly stressful situa-
tion of combat, the opportunities he was offered to overcome his habit after the war, and so 
forth” (Anderson 1999: 310). 
zfwu 7/2 (2006), 183-201 193
‘smoker case’ example) and, for this reason, might ‘undermine’ the system of distribu-
tion, but it seems to be that Anderson’s ‘smoker case’ is too extreme to be a good 
example for normal cases. However, life is not simple and one has also to cope with 
those extreme cases. But this special problem always appears according to penumbra 
cases, the only way out is trying to make well-informed decisions. Not to distribute 
extra resources to people, who are in need by virtue of undeserved misfortune, might 
be the wrong decision. You have to ask yourself if you want to live in that kind of 
society. 
Thirdly, the objection of complexity, which had been brought into the discussion by 
Lucas (1965, 1977) and Rescher (1966), could also be found in the first chapter of 
Walzer’s book ‘Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality’ (1983: 3-30). 
His criticism is powerful and illuminating. The main point against egalitarianism is his 
assumption that the ‘spheres of justice’ are much more complicated than egalitarians 
believe. Their assumption that equality is the only – or most important – aim (res. 
principle) of justice is a false monism. There are, according to the prioritarians, other 
principles of distribution like the principle of merit or desert, the principle of effi-
ciency, or the principle of qualification etc. Nearly every sphere of conduct has special 
principles of distribution. Krebs short commentary on a complex example given by 
Feinberg 1963: 89-91, in which two candidates apply for the post as a Dean of a col-
lege at Cambridge University, shows that she attacks a weak version of egalitarianism: 
“Unsere Gerechtigkeitskultur ist damit >>so kompliziert wie das Leben selbst<<.
Der Glaube, man könne diese Kultur im Wesentlichen über ein oder zwei Prin-
zipien, das Gleichheitsprinzip in Kombination mit dem Prinzip der Wohl-
fahrtssteigerung, einfangen, zeugt von der Philosophenkrankheit der theoriever-
liebten Überheblichkeit gegenüber der Wirklichkeit. Die Egalitaristen sind zu 
sehr >>Freunde einfacher Verhältnisse<<, um der Komplexität unserer Gerechtig-
keitskultur gerecht zu werden” (Krebs 2000: 27). 
As I already stated, one should not hold the assumption that ‘all’ egalitarians pursue an 
improper account of egalitarianism, the least do. But, of course, a sophisticated ac-
count of pluralistic egalitarianism is much more harder to attack as a simple travesty. 
However, Walzer’s ‘relevant reasons approach’ (or theory of ‘complex equality’) is 
very suitable with regard to different spheres of justice because his account considers 
special circumstances of the subjects in question. The main difference between his 
account and luck egalitarianism is, according to the ‘relevant reasons approach,’ that 
equality is only a by-product of the fulfilment of complex standards of justice and not 
the aim of justice. The question, if egalitarianism is bound to the assumption that 
equality is the only aim of justice and not also a by-product, has to be discussed in the 
next part, but it seems to be that there is no strong argument that supports this ex-
treme view, it just had been taken for granted since Feinberg’s famous paper ‘Non-
comparative Justice’ (1974)7.
The objection of complexity tells us that there is no possibility for egalitarians to use 
different kind of principles of distribution without losing their egalitarian track (e.g. 
________________________ 
7  See Kane 1996: 380pp. for a critical discussion on Feinberg’s account. 
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Krebs 2000: 28p.). I am inclined to think that this assumption is wrong. Firstly, plural-
istic egalitarians are not bound to one principle, only; they could also integrate other 
principles like the principle of autonomy, the principle of liberty and so on without 
betraying themselves. Secondly, the idea of equality is not restricted to a simple ver-
sion of result equality (Gosepath 2003: 276), rather to a sophisticated version of pro-
portional equality, which covers different kind of principles. Hence, there seems to be 
a close connection to Walzer’s theory of ‘complex equality,’ although one would 
rather say that his theory is a non-egalitarian account. However, I will discuss these 
points in the third part of this paper in more detail. 
Before I will give my own short account on the relation between justice and equality 
in the next part, I would like to say something about the egalitarians’ assumption of 
‘the presumption of equality.’ Isaiah Berlin stated in his famous paper ‘Equality as an 
Ideal’ (1955/56) that equality does not need any justification, but only inequality does. 
He gives the following example to make his assumption plausible: If someone has a 
cake and there are 10 people to be taken into account, than, there is no need of justifi-
cation, automatically, if every person is getting a tenth part. But, if the distributor is 
not acting according to the principle of equal distribution, he has to give some special 
reasons for his decision. Frankfurt is right in his criticism of Berlin’s assumption 
(Frankfurt 1997: chapter 2). Even if common sense justifies Berlin’s ‘argument,’ one 
has to take into account that the equal distribution – in the example given by Berlin – 
has no moral advantage with regard to the unequal distribution. Although Frankfurt 
hold the same view as Berlin does – that the cake should be divided into ten equal 
parts – he gives a different justification concerning this distribution. The important 
point is, so Frankfurt, that the distributor in this example has no special reasons to 
divide the cake in equal parts nor to divide the cake in unequal parts. In one word, he 
does not know if the people should be treated equally concerning a special respect, 
which could justify an equal distribution, or vice versa. The distributor has no relevant 
information at all. 
Unfortunately, there are just few philosophers who give reasons why equality needs 
no justification, others – as Berlin does – take it for granted and/or call for common 
sense or intuitions. I will present an account given by the famous German philoso-
pher, Ernst Tugendhat (1997), who tries to show by argument that only inequality 
needs special reasons. According to Tugendhat, egalitarianism in the strict sense is not 
about material equal distribution, but about the simple fact that all people have equal 
moral rights (5), albeit their empirical differences (10). Prioritarians think that there are 
good reasons to restrict equality (14). Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are not on the 
same level, since egalitarians – unlike prioritarians – claim for a special proposition. 
Prioritarians, so Tugendhat, are not bound to a special proposition; their accounts are 
unlimited concerning the variety of different ‘Konfigurationen,’8 and hence, prioritari-
anism claims not for a certain proposition (11). This is the background, according to 
Tugendhat, to have the justified believe that there is a certain presumption of equality 
with regard to inequality in the moral realm, albeit this presumption is very ‘thin,’ but 
________________________ 
8  The notion ‘Konfiguration’ means the description of duties and rights of a certain moral com-
munity (see Tugendhat 1997: 5). 
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it doubtlessly exists (11). In more detail: Regarding an unequal distribution one gives 
always some reasons why the distribution should not be equal; one is not able to do so 
concerning an equal distribution (13).9 See the following statement of Tugendhat: 
“Die Wichtigkeit des Satzes, daß eine gleiche Verteilung gerecht ist, außer daß es 
gute, rechtfertigbare Gründe für das Gegenteil gibt, liegt darin, daß in Fragen 
der Gerechtigkeit Gleichheit und Ungleichheit nicht in einem symmetrischen 
Verhältnis stehen und daß, was als onus probandi bezeichnet wird – die Beweislast 
–, immer beim Inegalitarier liegt. Er ist es, der Gründe angeben muß, und diese 
Gründe sind Gründe für die Einschränkung der Gleichheit, und das einzige, was 
der Egalitarier tun muß, ist, gegen die Gründe für die Begrenzung der Gleich-
heit, die der Inegalitarier gibt, zu argumentieren; man kann aber von ihm nicht 
verlangen (und es hätte auch gar keinen Sinn), Gründe dafür anzuführen, daß 
die Gleichheit der Ausgangspunkt ist; sie ist ja der Ausgangspunkt genauso für 
seinen Gegner” (Tugendhat 1997: 14). 
If one accepts Tugendhat’s assumption that the primacy of equality is, lastly, due to 
the structure of moral justification10 and not due to a false understanding of an apriori 
or a dark notion of reason, one might come to the conclusion that his explication is 
sound. Of course, there are other accounts of philosophers, but I hold Tugendhat’s 
account by virtue of several reasons for very interesting and illuminating. Firstly, he 
rightly states that egalitarianism is about moral rights in the strict sense of the notion, 
secondly, he is right in arguing that egalitarianism and prioritarianism are not on the 
same level, and thirdly, he is right in his assumption that the primacy of equality is due 
to the structure of moral justification. Although I find his account plausible, I will give 
a different approach in the following part. 
3.
The above criticism of different philosophers on the egalitarian approach of the rela-
tion between justice and equality is to a great extent correct if one accepts the picture 
they draw of their opponents. They attack a travesty, an extreme view of egalitarian-
ism hardly no one argues for and not a sophisticated version of pluralistic egalitarian-
ism. Of course, the extreme ‘egalitarian’ view that equality – in the special sense of 
comparative equality – is the only aim of justice is wrong, but the other extreme ‘priori-
________________________ 
9  Tugendhat 1997: 13: ‘Es ist auch nicht möglich, den Satz, daß die Verteilung gleich sein muß, 
wenn es keine guten Gründe fürs Gegenteil gibt, beiseite zu lassen und einfach die Gründe für 
Ungleichheit aufzuzählen; wir können das nicht, weil der Sinn dieser Gründe gerade darin be-
steht, daß sie Gründe für eine nicht-gleiche Verteilung sind. Die Gründe verweisen also notwen-
digerweise auf Gleichheit, da sie Gründe dafür sind, warum die gerechte Verteilung auch gleich 
sein kann. Das erklärt, warum, wenn es keine Gründe dagegen gibt, die Gleichverteilung zwin-
gend ist’. 
10  According to Tugendhat (1997), ‘moral justification’ means that it is an equal justification with 
respect to all people. The only case of a legitimate justification of inequality is the case, which 
could be justified with regard to all people (18). Every just distribution has to be equal, unless one 
is able to justify the reasons concerning the unequal distribution to all people (19). 
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tarian’ view that equality has nothing to do with justice is also wrong.11 The truth is 
somewhere in-between and I would like to say something more about this penumbra. 
It seems to be that the opposition between philosophers who are egalitarians and 
those who are prioritarians is, as Miller (1990) already stated, a false one, and better be 
‘understood as a debate about whether one particular kind of equality – economic 
equality, say – should be pursued or not’ (Miller 1997: 222). And maybe, he is right in 
stating that ‘there are two different kinds of valuable equality, one connected with 
justice, and the other standing independently’ (Miller 1997: 224). He suggests a so-
called third way: 
“Equality of the first kind is distributive in nature. It specifies that benefits of a 
certain kind – rights, for instance – should be distributed equally, because justice 
requires this. The second kind of equality is not in this sense distributive. It does 
not specify directly any distribution of rights or resources. Instead it identifies a 
social ideal, the ideal of a society in which people regard and treat one another 
as equals, in other words a society that is not marked by status divisions such 
that one can place different people in hierarchically ranked categories, in differ-
ent classes for instance. We can call this second kind of equality equality of status,
or simply social equality” (Miller 1997: 224). 
I think Miller is right in saying that the two different notions of equality are not closely 
enough separated in the debate. According to Nagel (1979: chapter 3-6) everybody 
thinks that moral equality – or mutatis mutandis ‘social equality’ in Miller’s words – is 
something all people acknowledge, but the crux is that the interpretations diverge, for 
instance, with regard to utilitarians (chapter 4), the position of individual rights (chap-
ter 5), and egalitarians (chapter 6). I am quite sympathetic with Nagel’s proposal that 
one has not to decide oneself between these radical different accounts of moral equal-
ity, instead he suggests, that a plausible Social Ethics would be influenced by all three 
accounts (chapter 7). However, I disagree with Miller’s assumption that social equality 
is something that is not part of justice. Tugendhat is right in stating that egalitarianism 
in the strict sense is about moral rights, hence, if I understood him rightly, social 
equality as such is one part of justice. If you restrict someone’s moral rights, you bet-
ter give sound reasons why you do not treat him equally according to others, if you are 
not able to give a plain justification, you treat him unjustly. And this has, normally, 
nothing to do with any kind of distributions, although Miller seems to hold the claim 
that moral rights could also be distributed, which I would deny by virtue of reasons I 
already gave. 
________________________ 
11  There are, at least, four different aspects, which show that justice and equality are (closely) con-
nected with each other: Firstly, according to prioritarians equality is important as a by-product for 
the fulfilment of absolute standards, for instance, human dignity. Secondly, relational (res. com-
parative) equality is one aspect of justice among others; one needs relational equality in order to 
yield e.g. legal equality, equality of chances, or antidiscrimination laws. Thirdly, equality as a start-
ing point with regard to political autonomy, social membership, or liberty of exchange; since ab-
solute standards presuppose that people’s life prospects are more or less the same. Fourthly, 
equality is a result of political autonomy; there might be special cases – e.g. the Norwegian public 
oil reserves – according to which an equal distribution is rightly demanded. 
zfwu 7/2 (2006), 183-201 197
Some egalitarians cite Aristotle’s famous propositions that, firstly, it is just that equal 
people get equal shares and unequal people get unequal shares, and secondly, it is 
unjust that equal people get unequal shares and unequal people get equal shares (EN 
V, 6) to back up their main hypothesis that the presumption of equality follows di-
rectly from Aristotle’s account of formal equality. But, they did not analyse the whole 
context of these propositions, which I will cite at length to show that one should bet-
ter not ground the argument of ‘the presumption of equality’ on this passage. Instead, 
with respect to another point, the passage could be turned against the prioritarian view 
that egalitarians are bound to a form of result equality. 
“kai_ h3 au0th_ e1stai i0so/thj, oi9=j kai_ e0n oi9=j: w3j ga_r e0kei=na e1xei, ta_ e0n oi9=j, 
ou9=tw ka0kei=na e1xei: ei0 ga_r mh_ i1soi, ou0k i1sa e/3cousin, a0ll’ e0nteu=qen ai3
ma/xai kai_ ta_ e0gklh/mata, o3tan h0_ mh_ i1sa i1soi h0_ mh_ i1soi i1sa e1xwsi kai_
ne/mwntai. e1ti e0k tou= kat’ a0ci/an tou=to dh=lon: to_ ga_r di/kaion e0n tai=j
nomai=j o3mologou=si pa/ntej kat’ a0ci/an tina_ dei=n ei0=nai, th_n me/ntoi 
a0ci/an ou0 th_n au0th_n le/gousi pa/ntej [u3pa/rxein], a0ll’ o3i me_n dhmok-
ratikoi_ e0leuqeri/an, oi3 d’ o0ligarxikoi_ plou=ton, oi4 d’ eu0ge/neian, oi3 d’
a0ristokratikoi_ a0reth/n. e1stin a1ra to_ di/kaion a0na/logo/n ti” (Aristoteles 
EN V, 6 1131a20-1131a29).12
Of course, Aristotle is right in saying that there is always trouble if unequals get equal 
shares, that means, if equals get unequal shares or unequals get equal shares (ei0 ga_r
mh_ i1soi, ou0k i1sa e/3cousin, a0ll’ e0nteu=qen ai3 ma/xai kai_ ta_ e0gklh/mata, o3tan h0_
mh_ i1sa i1soi h0_ mh_ i1soi i1sa e1xwsi kai_ ne/mwntai). But, there is no claim in the cited 
passage, which says that all people should be treated equally (presumption of equality), 
rather all people should be treated equally according to a special a0ci/a, namely the 
poli/tikh_ a0reth/, but this is a different story (proportional equality). According to 
Aristotle’s account of justice in Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics one has to ac-
knowledge the fact that the proposition ‘equals should get equal shares’ is due to the 
principle of proportional equality (distributional justice), and should not be seen under 
the heading of justice ‘to_ e0n toi=j sunalla/gmasi diorqwtiko/n’ (Aristotle EN V, 5 
1131a) – where the principle of arithmetical equality exists – which is about justice 
concerned with exchanges according to reciprocity (EN V, 8) and retributive justice 
(EN V, 7). To put it in a nutshell, the formal principle of equality – equals should get 
equal shares or in a different formula equal cases should be treated equally – is empty, 
and the prioritarians, on the one hand, are right in saying that egalitarians are wrong in 
their assumption that the presumption of equality is due to this formal principle. Aris-
totle’s approach to fill it is his account of proportional equality. And there is, on the 
other hand, no sound argument in sight – with respect to the debate between egalitari-
________________________ 
12  “And the same equality will exist between the persons and between the things concerned; for as 
the latter – the things concerned – are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they will 
not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints – when either equals have 
and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is plain from the fact that 
awards should be according to merit; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be 
according to merit in some sense, though they do notall specify the same sort of merit, but de-
mocrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble 
birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence” (Barnes 1995). 
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ans and prioritarians – that would claim for the special proposition that egalitarians are 
bound to ‘result equality,’ only, and not also to ‘proportional equality’ within a sophis-
ticated version of pluralistic egalitarianism (e.g. Gosepath 2004). Maybe, some priori-
tarians forget the simple point that there are two ways of taking other people’s condi-
tion into account, firstly, by proportional equality, and secondly, by stipulating abso-
lute standards of justice. 
Equality as the only aim of justice or as a mere by-product of justice is an unhappy dis-
tinction to follow. Justice cannot be reduced to equality alone and the importance of 
equality is too great to be a mere appendage. The prioritarians are right in their criti-
cism that it would be absurd to strive for equality for its own sake; but they forgot that 
hardly any sophisticated version of egalitarianism is doing so (or would do so). Of 
course, it would be absurd if people hold the view that all human beings should be 
treated equally by virtue of the simple fact that the ideal of equality should be fulfilled 
for its own sake. Instead, the demand of treating people morally equal13, maybe, gives 
some hints for equal distributions in other spheres.14 But, as Walzer nicely puts it, 
nearly each sphere needs its own standard, and therefore, it might be right not to 
choose between the egalitarian or prioritarian view but to combine both accounts. 
According to this, Gosepath 2001 rightly suggests that proportional equality could be 
a good basis for a sound discussion between egalitarian and prioritarian theories of 
justice.
There is a close connection between justice and equality, firstly, a conceptual connec-
tion, and secondly, a normative connection. First, equality is a necessary condition for 
justice, since one is not able to give a full explication on the notion of justice without 
taking formal and proportional equality into account (see Aristotle EN V). The stipu-
lation of absolute standards of justice, for instance human dignity, is something, which 
should be incorporated. But it should be clear that the stipulation of absolute stan-
dards is not enough, one should also take the egalitarian model into account. Aristotle 
is certainly right in saying that justice is always pro_j e/3teron. To examine the right 
share one has to take, at least, two things into account: i.) What is the a0ci/a of distri-
bution (e.g. merit, desert, virtue etc.)? and ii.) The people must be compared with 
respect to each other’s portion of a0ci/a. Second, in his famous example of a ruler who 
fries his subjects in oil and, afterwards, also fries himself Frankena (1962: 1 and 17) is 
rightly stating that the ruler acts immorally but not against ideal of equality. This is the 
reason why formal and proportional justices form a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition. The normative connection between justice and equality tries to solve this 
problem by using ‘moral equality’ – which is the main aspect of this connection – as a 
shield against such and alike cases Frankena describes. In this paper I am not defend-
ing the claim of treating people as equals, I presupposed the rightness of the claim for 
________________________ 
13  According to Gosepath 2004: 184 one could say the following on ‘moral equality’: ‘Moralische 
Gleichheit beinhaltet vor allem: einen Anspruch auf gleiche Anerkennung und Sicherung der in-
dividuellen Autonomie; einen Anspruch auf gleiche Würde, auch wenn das substantiell kein neuer 
oder konkreter Gesichtspunkt ist; und ein Verbot primärer Diskriminierung, worunter eine Un-
gleichbehandlung unter der Annahme gegebener Wertunterschiede zwischen Menschen zu ver-
stehen ist, die angeblich unterschiedliche (oft proportionale) Ansprüche rechtfertigen’. 
14  On this topic see Gosepath 2001. 
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the sake of argument here, but it is certainly right that this is a hard problem to cope 
with.15 However, Gosepath (2001, 2004) is making an interesting proposal to derive 
‘the presumption of equality’ and his principle of ‘a liberal-egalitarian distributional 
justice’ from ‘moral equality.’ Both parts, in his view, are additional components ac-
cording to the normative connection between justice and equality.16
What remains is that we are still in the beginning of giving a sound approach both 
sides – egalitarians and prioritarians – can live with, but the journey has not yet begun. 
The aim of this paper was to clear the ground for this ‘new’ and fairer discussion. 
4.
Justice is not only about treating people morally equal or to give everybody his due, 
but it entails – according to Aristotelian thought – a way of living a good life. Of 
course, nobody really wants to live in a society that treats people morally unequal or 
distributes resources not according to everybody’s due. This is not the world we 
would like to live in. Therefore, it should be no problem to help people, no matter if 
they got into trouble on their own. They are human beings and they have human dig-
nity, hence, we must help them if some of them struggle or need help. And no theo-
retical discussion could proof vice versa, there is no sound argument in sight that 
could convince ‘a good man’ (fro/nimoj) not to help a human being who is in need, 
no matter if it is his fault or it is up to the circumstances etc. It is time for the discus-
sion to come down on earth again. Of course, it is not only about looking at other 
people and comparing their condition with one’s own; there is no sound reason for 
people to be envious or to feel superior with respect to other people. We are all hu-
man beings with different talents and with a great variety of life prospects, which is 
due – to a great extent – to the circumstances we are living in. And again, it is human 
dignity that says we are all morally equal and it is our duty as human beings to care for 
people, who are worst off or badly off wherever they are. Resources – to help all of 
them – are limited, and therefore, the priority principle is a good way to cope with this 
problem, without saying that this is the only way; it is a good start, but has to be ac-
companied by other egalitarian considerations. The truth is that this debate had been 
long enough in the ivory tower of philosophy. It is time for a change. 
________________________ 
15  On this very interesting issue see Cupit 2000, although I did not share his view that individualism 
is the basis for treating people as equals: ‘And further, I want to suggest that we should under-
stand the claim that we are to be treated as equals as following from the claim that we are to be 
treated as incomparable’ (120). 
16  By virtue of pragmatic reasons I am not able to discuss his account in this paper. The reader is 
kindly asked to make himself familiar with Gosepath’s approach. 
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